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Abstract
Two equilibrium possibilities are known to obtain in a standard overlapping-generations
model with dynastic preferences: either the altruistic bequest motive is operative for
every generation (in which case, Ricardian equivalence obtains) or it is not, for any
generation. Dynamic equilibria, where the bequest motive is occasionally operative,
cannot emerge. This paper studies bequest-giving behavior and out-of-steady-state
bequest and growth dynamics in a Ak model with intra- and intergenerational con-
sumption externalities. These externalities, by their very presence, do not destroy
Ricardian equivalence. They may, however, give rise to deviant generations — gener-
ations that do not leave a bequest having received an inheritance, and vice versa —
and that seals the fate for Ricardian equivalence. Consumption externalities may also
generate interesting indeterminacies and endogenous growth cycles that did not exist
otherwise.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is well accepted that parents inﬂuence the behavior of their children. For example,
parents set a benchmark consumption level urging their children to aspire to that level
and beyond (see, for example, de la Croix and Michel, 2002). Another direct channel of
parental inﬂuence on children is via transfers they make. This has received prominent
attention in the arena of public policy, especially in the context of Ricardian equivalence,
the invariance of an individual’s consumption decisions to changes in lump-sum taxes.
It is standard fare (see Aiyagari, 1992) in most models of inﬁnitely-lived agents that Ri-
cardian equivalence holds. On the other hand, in the domain of inﬁnite-horizon economies
with ﬁnitely-lived agents, discussions surrounding Ricardian equivalence take on a speciﬁc
form: researchers endow agents with dynastic preferences and ask, Under what conditions
is the altruistic bequest motive — the transfer of resources from parents to children moti-
vated by parental altruism — operative? For if it is and at every date, as Barro (1974) and
Weil (1987) have argued, Ricardian equivalence again obtains — altruistic parents simply
neutralize any change in the present value of their children’s taxes via appropriate transfers.
This paper analyzes how within and across generation consumption externalities aﬀect
the evolution of the altruistic bequest motive across generations. It is part of a line of
inquiry dating back to the early contributions by Weil (1987) and Abel (1987) — and more
recently, Michel et. al (2006), Abel (2005), and Alonso-Carrera et. al. (2008) — into the op-
erativeness of the bequest motive in overlapping-generation economies. A main focus of this
literature is the existence of a steady state with positive bequests in the textbook version of
Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generations model, one with a concave, neoclassical technol-
ogy. Our principal value-added is a detailed analysis of the out-of-steady-state bequest and
growth dynamics in a fairly-standard Ak model. Such a study exposes the novel possibility
of deviant generations, those whose bequest-giving behavior diverges along the extensive
margin from that of their parents. And it is the phenomenon of deviant generations, not
consumption externalities per se, that nulliﬁes Ricardian equivalence.
2Our analysis begins, in Section 3, with a study of bequests in a benchmark model, one
sans intra and intergenerational consumption externalities. Here, we show that the bequest
motive is operative if and only if the expected future growth rate exceeds a certain thresh-
old, or equivalently, if and only if the factor measuring the degree of altruism — the utility
weight placed by a parent on her child’s well-being — is suﬃciently high. Next, echoing the
discussion in Abel (1987) and Aiyagari (1992), we prove another important result for the
benchmark model: either the altruistic bequest motive is operative for every generation
or it is not for any generation. The prospect of generating intergenerational diﬀerences in
bequest-giving behavior along an extensive margin — some generation may leave a bequest,
itself not having received an inheritance, or vice versa — simply does not arise.1’2 In short,
deviant generations are not possible in the benchmark model. Parenthetically, the only
equilibria are stationary: depending on the value of the altruism factor, the economy is
either instantly at a steady state in which the bequest motive is operative at each date or
it is not. In short, there is a unique equilibrium; no indeterminacies, transitional dynamics,
volatility in the growth rate, nor deviant generations, are possible in the benchmark model.
In Section 4, we introduce within and across generation consumption externalities in the
model. At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that any and all such externalities automatically ring
the death knell for Ricardian equivalence. After all, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem is
valid under a fairly stringent set of assumptions (intergenerational altruism, perfect capital
markets, lump-sum taxation, exogenous fertility, and so on), and any important deviation,
such as the introduction of externalities, ought to be suﬃcient to invalidate it.3 We show
1Most models with ﬁnitely-lived agents restrict attention to equilibria in which the bequest motive is
operative at all dates. Generally, such models generate intergenerational diﬀerences in bequest-giving along
an intensive margin — some generation leaves more, some leave less. None of them exhibit aforediscussed
diﬀerences — emerging endogenously — along an extensive margin. Our setup is capable of generating
disparities along both margins.
2Intergenerational diﬀerences in bequest-giving have wide-ranging implications well beyond their eﬀect
on Ricardian equivalence. Bequests constitute an important channel for capital accumulation. They are a
major channel for the transmission of wealth across generations; as such, intergenerational diﬀerences in
bequests have the potential to perpetuate wealth inequality across generations. For a recent tratement of
this last issue, see Alvarez-Cuadrado and Long (2009).
3Also see Bossi and Porqueras (2010) who, in a somewhat diﬀerent setting, make a case against Ricardian
3that is not the case. Indeed, a unique equilibrium exists in which the bequest motive is
operative at each date, provided the altruism factor is suﬃciently high. Here, Ricardian
equivalence holds.
Three additional items deserve mention here. First, the equilibrium growth rate in the
model with consumption externalities under a operative bequest motive is exactly equal
to its counterpart in the benchmark model. The implication is that when the bequest
motive is operative at each date, the presence or absence of consumption externalities has
no eﬀect on the growth rate. Second, we ask: Is it possible that Ricardian equivalence
does not obtain in the benchmark economy and yet, it does, in the corresponding model
with consumption externalities? We ﬁnd, under a simple suﬃcient condition, the answer
is, yes. The presence of consumption externalities may have the potential to “jump start”
bequest-giving, with concomitant implications for the neutrality of tax policy.
Finally, somewhat curiously, when the altruism factor is not too high, the model can
only generate equilibria in which the bequests are passed along for ﬁnitely-many consec-
utive dates; importantly, it cannot support growth paths in which the bequest motive is
operative asymptotically. As a consequence, Ricardian equivalence does not hold in the
long run. And yet, bequests are left and received by arbitrarily many generations, just not
each and every one. This is in sharp contrast to what transpires in the benchmark model
where either bequests are left and received by each and every generation or they are not
for any generation. We show that deviant, out-of-steady state equilibrium paths – paths
where any one particular generation does not leave (receive) a bequest even though their
predecessors did (did not), nor do their progeny wish to replicate the bequest-giving behav-
ior of their parents – exist. Heuristically, this may happen, for example, when members
of one generation, having received an inheritance from the previous generation, chooses not
to leave a bequest to the next, especially if they are trying hard to keep up with the latter’s
consumption. When parents feel the need to keep up, there is a natural tension between
equivalence under the assumption of intertertemporally non-separable preferences.
4leaving a bequest to children (which presumably raises the childrens’ consumption) and
not leaving one (which keeps the childrens’ consumption low and hence easier to emulate).
In Section 5, for example, we show the existence of a 3-period limit cycle in the growth
rate. In such a cycle, a generous but deviant Generation t (one that receives no inheritance
but leaves a bequest), may be followed by a ‘normal’ Generation t+1(one whose bequest
decision is similar to their parents – and in this case, leaves a bequest), and a stingy de-
viant (a Generation t+2that receives an inheritance but leaves no bequest), before coming
full-circle to a new, generous Generation t +3 . A non-negativity constraint on bequests
– parents cannot legally commit their children to assume debts on their behalf – which
binds for some generations, is critical in generating these cyclical patterns of gift-giving.
Why might the possibility of deviant generations be of interest? The reason is that
Ricardian equivalence requires “...all generations be linked by operative-intergenerational
transfer motives. If some generation has no operative-intergenerational transfer motive,
then at least some changes in the timing of lump-sum taxes will aﬀect the intertemporal
allocation of resources.” [Abel, 1987]. Abel had not demonstrated the existence of such
deviant generations; indeed, Michel et al (2006, Section 3.2) study the dynamics for an
economy identical to one studied in Abel (1987) and conclude that “the possibility to
switch from a temporary equilibrium with positive bequests to a temporary equilibrium
with zero bequests along the transition path is excluded in the Cobb-Douglas economy.”4
By establishing the existence of deviant generations, we provide an example — the ﬁrst to
our knowledge — that supports Abel’s hypothesis regarding the breakdown of Ricardian
equivalence.5 In sum, intergenerational consumption externalities, by their very presence,
4Indeed, in their Handbook chapter, Michel et. al (2006) suggest “analysing dynamics switching between
a temporary equilibrium with positive bequests and a temporary equilibrium with zero bequests is an issue
for future research.”
5It deserves mention here that deviant generations arise endogenously in our framework; unlike Dutta
and Michel (1998) or Michel and Pestieau (1998) or Aiyagari (1992), we do not impose any heterogeneity
in altruism or discount factors.
A type of deviant generations arises in the analysis of Abel (1988) and de la Croix and Michel (pg. 255,
2002). There, a temporary increase in government spending is ﬁnanced by an increase in the tax on old
households of a particular generation thereby driving that generation to a zero-bequest corner. Even in this
5do not destroy Ricardian equivalence. They may, however, generate the phenomenon of
deviant generations, which in turn, nulliﬁes Ricardian equivalence.
The analysis, in the spirit of Liu and Turnovsky (2005), also uncovers important impli-
cations for indeterminacies. As demonstrated in the paper, in the model with consumption
externalities, the relationship between the current and future growth rate is a correspon-
dence (any value of the current growth rate is consistent with two values of the future
growth rate). This means, given the current growth rate, the actions of perfect-foresight
agents can lead to either high or low growth rates the following period. Hence, along two
equilibrium sequences that emanate from the same initial condition, the time series of
growth rates may look very diﬀerent. The upshot for convergence is that countries that
“look similar” at some point in time, may end up looking very diﬀerent, in the future. It is
evident that consumption externalities are responsible for these indeterminacies, since the
latter do not appear in the benchmark model.
It is of independent interest that the economy we study is capable of generating limit
cycles of varying periodicities — including three and higher period cycles — in the growth
rate. In the literature, virtually all models that generate growth cycles are technology, not
preference, driven (see, for example, Matsuyama (1999) or Walde (2005)). In our model,
periodic equilibria in the real growth rate emerge in a relatively standard economy; indeed,
absent the non-negativity constraint on bequests, the model economy does not produce
endogenous ﬂuctuations of any kind.6 These cyclical equilibria tell important stories of
non-convergence in bequest-giving patterns across economies. In our setup, depending on
ﬁnancing scenario, the bequest motive is operative in the long run.
6Ours is not yet another paper demonstrating the presence of indeterminacies in overlapping generation
(OG) models. It is clear that the OG nature of the model is not responsible for the indeterminacies we
demonstrate since these do not appear in the benchmark model.
Similarly, there is a vast literature studying the possibility of complex dynamicss — periodic (even chaotic)
equilibria in overlapping generations models. Most of that literature is concerned with studying nominal
cycles (i.e., ﬂuctuations in price levels). The rest of that literature has focused on studying cycles in the
levels of the capital stock or output. To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the ﬁrst to show
existence of high-order cycles in the growth rate via the preference route (and that too, in a reasonably
standard economy).
6initial conditions, generations in Economy I may leave a bequest at ﬁnitely-many successive
dates, while those in Economy II (starting oﬀ with slightly diﬀerent initial conditions) may
perpetually vacillate, some leaving a bequest and others not.
Finally, it may seem that consumption externalities do little more than generate con-
sumption ﬂoors for various generations, and that replacing all such externalities by a simple
generational minimum consumption requirement (one that tracks the growing economy,
such as in Álvarez-Peláez and Díaz, 2005) would be suﬃcient to generate all the results,
including the possibility of deviant generations. We prove this is not the case. In Section
6, we prove that the qualitative properties of such an economy are identical to that of the
benchmark model — the one sans consumption externalities.
2 Environment
Consider an economy populated by an inﬁnite sequence of two-period lived overlapping
generations and an initial old generation. At each date, t =1 ,2,3..., a new generation
is born; each consists of a continuum of agents with mass 1. Each agent, starting with
Generation 1, has one unit of time when young and retires when old. Each initial old
agent is endowed with k1 > 0 units of capital. At the start of each date t, an old agent
(potentially) passes on a bequest of amount bt−1 to her oﬀspring. We assume agents
face a non-negativity constraint on bequests — meaning, of course, that a parent has no
legally binding way to extract a gift from her oﬀspring. Of particular interest here is the
conditions under which this constraint will, and will not, bind. We say that the bequest
motive is operative at date t whenever bt > 0.
The sole ﬁnal good of the economy is produced using a production function F(Kt,L t),
where Kt denotes the capital input and Lt denotes the labor input at t. Let kt ≡ Kt/Lt
denote the capital-labor ratio (capital per young agent). Output per young agent at time t
may be expressed as yt = f(kt); f(kt) ≡ F(Kt/Lt,1) is the intensive form. The ﬁnal good
is either be consumed in the period it is produced or it can be stored to yield capital the
7following period. For analytical tractability, capital is assumed to depreciate 100% between
periods.











¢1−α where i indexes a ﬁrm among a continuum of unit measure, and ¯ K
denotes the average of all Kis. Firms in the economy are competitive and factors are
paid their marginal product. Let w denote the wage and q denote the gross interest rate.
Assuming ﬁrms are identical, Li
t =1 , and φ =1 −α, output at date t (expressed in intensive
form) is yt = Akt,a n d
wt =( 1− α)Akt (1)
qt = αA. (2)
For future reference, deﬁne the (gross) growth rate between dates t and t +1as γt ≡
yt+1/yt = kt+1/kt.
An agent born at t chooses consumption when young (old) ct, (xt), saves st,a n dp o s s i -
bly, leaves a bequest, bt.L e tΩt denote a vector of the economy-wide state variables facing
a young agent born at date t. Ωt includes, along with factor prices, consumption ﬂoors θt
(δt) that the agent faces when young (old); Ωt ≡ (wt;qt;θt;δt). Given her inheritance, bt−1,
the agent solves the following problem: choose ct,x t,s t,b t to:
V (Ωt;bt−1) ≡ max [u(ct;θt)+βu(xt;δt)+λβV (Ωt+1;bt)] (3)
subject to:
c-1 ct + st ≤ wt + bt−1
c-2 xt + bt ≤ qtst
c-3 ct ≥ θt; xt ≥ δt.
c-4 st ≥ 0; bt ≥ 0.
8The parameter 1 >λ≥ 0 captures the weight of the child’s utility relative to the
parent’s; this form, with λ<1 is known as ‘impure altruism’.7 β>0 is a parameter.8
Following Barnett and Bhattacharya (2008) and Alonso-Carrera et. al. (2008), the
consumption ﬂoors θ and δ are deﬁned as follows:
θt ≡ (θy¯ ct + θo¯ xt−1); δt ≡ (δy¯ ct+1 + δo¯ xt).
Here, variables with “bars” represent average levels of consumption, taken as parametric by
the agent. For example, ¯ ct represents the average level of consumption of the agent’s gener-
ational cohorts when she is young. In equilibrium, ct =¯ ct and xt =¯ xt will hold. θy and θo
represent scalars capturing the strength of the inﬂuence of the current youth and current
old’s consumption, respectively, on the young.9 Similarly, scalars δy and δo capture the
strength of the inﬂuence of the current youth and current old’s consumption, respectively,
on the consumption of the agent when old. This formulation allows a generation other than
one’s own to inﬂuence the agent’s consumption decision. Such intra- and intergenerational
consumption externalities feature prominently in Abel (2005) and Alonso-Carrera et. al.
(2008). Speciﬁcally, Barnett and Bhattacharya (2008) associate δy > 0 with “rejuvenile”
behavior: the current old trying to keep up with the current young. Sociologists and other
social scientists have noted the increasing inﬂuence of youth-culture and tastes on other
members of society. See Noxon (2006) for a casual but enlightening discussion.
Of critical importance is the non-negativity constraint on bequests in c-4 above. The
literature studying models with dynastic preferences and bequests has only analyzed steady
states in which this constraint either binds or it does not. The present model allows us to
consider the out-of-steady state possibility that the constraint may bind occasionally and
examine the associated dynamic consequences.
7These are the exact preferences used, for example, in Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Aiyagari, Green-
wood, and Sheshadri (2002).
8As is well known, it is not necessary to interpret β as a discount factor in two-period overlapping-
generation models. Indeed, β may be deﬁned as innate relative preference for old-age consumption. All our
results below go through even if β =1 .
9This is reminiscent of the notion of “keeping up with the ageing Joneses” in Fisher and Heijdra (2009).
9G i v e na ni n i t i a ls t o c ko fc a p i t a l ,k1, an initial old agent at date 1 chooses x0,b 0 to
maximize u(x0;δ1)+λβV (Ω1;b0) subject to x0 + b0 ≤ αAk1. For future reference, note
that while k1 > 0 is given, γ1, the initial growth rate, is not.
At each date, the following market-clearing conditions must hold:
Goods ct + xt−1 + kt+1 = yt
Capital st = kt+1
Labor Lt =1 .
Given k1, an equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of consumption allocations
{ct,x t}
∞





t=1 that solve the agents’ optimization problem at each date, satisfy the
market-clearing conditions, and the factor prices satisfy (1)-(2). Additionally, if the bequest





t u1 (ct;θt)bt−1 =0 .







for a = ct,x t, ψ = θt,δ t,w h e r eσ>0,θ t ≥ 0, and δt ≥ 0, for t ≥ 1.
3 The benchmark economy with no consumption externali-
ties
A useful benchmark to study is the special case of no consumption externalities of any kind.
A version of this, for a concave neoclassical production technology, has been studied by
10Michel et. al (2006). To the best of our knowledge, ours is a ﬁrst attempt at characterizing
stationary and non-stationary equilibria in the textbook Ak model with bequests.10
3.1 Equilibrium allocations
Set δy = δo = θy = θo =0 . In this case, the ﬁrst order conditions can be written as




t+1 (= if bt > 0). (6)
where z ≡ (βαA)
1/σ.I na ne q u i l i b r i u mw i t hbt > 0 ∀t>1, the bequest and consumption




t u0 (ct)bt−1 =0 . (7)
The ﬁrst condition (5) is standard. The second condition (6) states that for an old
agent, the marginal cost of a bequest (in utility terms) is at least as great as its marginal
beneﬁt, as measured by the parent. Since a bequest is passed along to the child as a
lump-sum income transfer, it does not alter the marginal conditions, summarized by (5)
for t+1, that determine the child’s optimal mix of young and old age consumption. Time
separability of the utility function explains why the impact of additional resources from
mother to child is captured solely by the marginal eﬀect of these resources only on the
child’s young-age utility, λu0 (ct+1).
A quick look at the consumption corner solution is in order. Consider a parent who does
not consume (xt =0 )and bequeaths her entire old-age capital income (αAkt);additionally
her child does not consume (ct =0 )and saves her entire wage income (1 − α)Akt. Using
the market-clearing conditions, we get kt+1 = Akt, and hence, in this case, the growth rate
10Caballe (1995) analyzes steady-state equilibria with positive and zero bequests in an endogenous growth
model, with human capital as the engine of growth.
11between t − 1 and t is γt = A. This is the maximum feasible growth rate in this economy.
Notice this upper bound is the same for a corresponding economy with consumption ex-
ternalities (since ct = xt =0imply θt = δt =0 ) . However, given the preferences in (4)
with ψ =0 , it is clear that lim
m→0
u0 (m)=∞,m= ct,x t holds, implying, for positive in-
comes, the corner ct = xt =0is never chosen, and hence, γt = A cannot be an equilibrium
growth rate. Henceforth, we restrict γt ∈ [0,A).
Given bt−1, we use (6) with equality, along with the budget constraint (c-1) and the
market-clearing conditions to solve for the agent’s consumption xt and bequest bt decisions.















αAγtkt if bt =0i.e., if γt+1 ≤ γbm
(A−γt+1)γtkt







((1 − α)A − γt)kt if γt ≤ γbm
λ1/σ(A−γt)kt




(1 − α) − αλ1/σ
´
, (8)
(the subscript “bm” stands for benchmark model). The consumption decision of an initial
old agent, x0, is similar to the expression for xt above, with k1 replacing γtkt everywhere,
and γt+1 = γ1.
Among the ﬁrst things to note is that while the size of ct depends on the current
growth rate, the size of old-age consumption xt depends on the future growth rate. From
the expression for bt, it is clear that the decision of the old at date t of whether or not
to pass along a bequest depends critically on the prospective growth rate. Speciﬁcally, a
12positive bequest is made if and only if the future growth rate γt+1, exceeds γbm.I n t h i s
connection, note that higher values of λ make it easier for the future growth rate to exceed
γbm. Next, note that ct ≥ 0 holds whenever 0 <γ t ≤ γbm,s i n c e((1 − α)A − γt)kt ≥
((1 − α)A − γbm)kt = αλ1/σkt for all γt ≤ γbm.W h e n γt >γ bm, for ct ≥ 0, we need
γt <A . Finally, if γbm < 0, the only possible equilibria will be those with positive
bequests.
Why are bequests dependent on a threshold value of the future growth rate? A suﬃ-
ciently high growth rate between dates t +1and t +2requires a high level of saving by
the child at t +1 , thereby raising the child’s marginal utility of young-age consumption
(which, as discussed above, also raises the marginal beneﬁt of the parent’s bequest gift).
This is weighed against the marginal cost of the gift — the parent’s marginal loss in utility
due to lowered consumption when old. The threshold growth rate γbm, then, represents a
rate of future growth such that the marginal cost of a bequest equals the marginal beneﬁt
of a bequest, both evaluated at bt =0 .
In passing, it should be pointed out that the expressions for optimal consumptions and
bequests are more tractable than what one gets in an otherwise-identical model with a
concave, neoclassical technology (such as, the one studied in Thibault, 2000 and Michel
et. al, 2006). This permits an easier characterization of the operativeness of the bequest
motive; in particular, it allows a full-blown dynamic analysis.
3.2 Dynamics of the growth rate and the pattern of bequests
Using (5) along with the solutions for the consumption allocations x and c derived in Section
3.1, one obtains a dynamic linkage connecting the growth rate at date t with that at date
t +1—aﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation in the growth rate, γt.G i v e ns o m eγt ∈ [0,A),a
momentary equilibrium at date t +1for this economy is a growth rate γt+1 ∈ [0,A) that
satisﬁes this diﬀerence equation. We deﬁne a momentary bequest equilibrium at date t+1
as a momentary equilibrium that additionally satisﬁes bt > 0. A momentary no-bequest
13equilibrium at date t +1is a momentary equilibrium that satisﬁes bt =0 . For future use,
we make the following parametric assumption:
Assumption 1 λ<(A/z)
σ
A dynamically-valid equilibrium law of motion for this economy is an inﬁnite sequence of
momentary equilibrium points, {γt}
∞
t=1 , which satisﬁes this diﬀerence equation, Assump-
tion 1, and γt ∈ [0,A) ∀t.
In this setting, there isn’t a unique expression for the equilibrium law of motion for the
growth rate. This is because at any date, γt S γbm and γt+1 S γbm are possible, which
in turn aﬀects the decision to leave bequests at that date. In other words, knowing γt,
one knows whether the current young received an inheritance from their parents, but not
whether they, in due course, would leave a bequest. Four cases need to be analyzed: one
where the current young neither received an inheritance nor did they leave a bequest (case
A), one where the current young did not receive an inheritance yet left a bequest (case B),
one where the current young received an inheritance and did not leave a bequest (case C),
and one where the current young received an inheritance and left a bequest (case D). These







⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
αAγt
((1−α)A−γt) if γt ≤ γbm ∧ γt+1 ≤ γbm case A
(A−γt+1)γt
(1+λ1/σ)((1−α)A−γt) if γt ≤ γbm ≤ γt+1 case B
(1+λ1/σ)αAγt
λ1/σ(A−γt) if γt+1 ≤ γbm ≤ γt case C
(A−γt+1)γt
λ1/σ(A−γt) if γbm ≤ γt ∧ γbm ≤ γt+1 case D
.
In appendix A, we show that the only possible momentary equilibria are those involving
either case A or case D but not both. In the former case, Ricardian equivalence does not
hold; it does in the latter case.
Proposition 1 a) Suppose the parametric condition, λ<(γbm/z)
σ , holds, where γbm is
deﬁned in (8); then no bequests are granted at any date and γt =
Az(1−α)
z+αA ∈ (0,A) for t ≥ 1.
14b) If (A/z)
σ >λ>(γbm/z)
σ , bequests are granted at each date, and γt = zλ
1
σ for t ≥ 1.
The steady state is locally unstable.
c) If λ ≥ (A/z)
σ , i.e., if Assumption 1 is violated, no equilibria exist.
If the weight of the child’s utility in the parent’s utility is suﬃciently low, no bequests
are passed on at any date, and the growth rate for such a economy is forever constant. If
the weight is high enough (but not too high), then bequests are passed on at every date,
and the growth rate for such a economy is also, forever constant.11
A few words about Proposition 1 are in order. These mutually-exclusive conditions
on λ preclude the co-existence of momentary bequest equilibria alongside momentary no-
bequest equilibria. The proposition further ensures that only a stationary equilibrium
obtains. Consequently, depending on λ, the economy is either, instantly at a steady state
in which the bequest motive is operative at each date, or it is not. There is no indeterminacy
of any kind; given λ, the equilibrium is unique.12
Why can’t the benchmark model economy support momentary equilibria where the
non-negativity constraint on bequests binds occasionally? To understand the intuition, it
suﬃces to understand, for example, why a old person never leaves a bequest if she did not
receive an inheritance when young. The logic is somewhat like this. If a young agent, Ms.
X, does not receive an inheritance at date t, it must be because her mother anticipates
(correctly) that her daughter will not save much of her wage (and potential) inheritance
income, which is precisely why the growth rate γt, is low, triggering a no-bequest given
response from the parent. Lacking an inheritance, Ms. X is unable to save enough to leave
11In the benchmark model, there may be a deviant generation at the initial date in a trivial sense. This
may happen, if for example, the initial old leave a bequest but no other generation does.
12Each momentary equilibrium γt+1 is indexed by the growth rate that precedes it, γt. This means
that any sequence of momentary equilibria will be indexed by γ1. Generally, this would imply the result-
ing sequence is indeterminate — the indeterminacy stemming from the fact that γ1 is arbitrarily chosen.
However, in this case, the limiting conditions for the sequence impose enough additional restrictions to
pin down the initial value γ1. In other words, the only values of γ1 that ensure a bona ﬁde equilibrium
obtains will be Az (1 − α)(/z + αA) or zλ
1
σ (depending on the size of the parameter λ in relationship to
[(1 − α)A/(αA + z)]
σ).
15a bequest of her own at date t +1 . On the other hand, if the mother leaves a bequest to
her child, the child is able to save enough to pass along a bequest herself, and suﬃciently
high saving at t ensures the growth rate γt >γ bm. Bequests bestow on the child the ability
to save enough to leave a bequest. If the initial bequest at date 1, b0, is large enough,
enabling Generation 1 to save enough to leave a bequest at date 2, all generations will have
suﬃcient wage and inheritance income to pass along a bequest to their oﬀspring.
4 Intergenerational consumption externalities
We turn next to a general setting in which intergenerational consumption externalities
a r ep r e s e n t .A sw ew i l ls h o w ,s u c hi n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a li n ﬂuences on consumption standards
have the potential to introduce interesting dynamics in bequest giving. It is here that the
possibility of deviant generations emerges.
4.1 Equilibrium allocations
Recall, a young agent’s problem is to maximize (3) subject to constraints (c-1)-(c-4). It is
easy to verify that analogous to (5) and (6), the ﬁrst order conditions are summarized by
xt − δt = z (ct − θt) (9)
(hereafter referred to as the “intragenerational optimality linkage”) and
(ct+1 − θt+1) ≥ λ1/σ (xt − δt)( = if bt > 0), (10)
(hereafter, the “intergenerational optimality linkage”).





((1 − θy)(1− α)A − αAθo − (1 − θy)γt)kt if γt ≤ γce
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λ1/σ (1 − δo + δy)+( 1− θy + θo)
,
and the cut-oﬀ growth rate is given by





σ (1 − δo)
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(the subscript “ce” stands for consumption externalities). Below we show that γt+1 ≥ A1
always holds. If
(1 − δo)α<δ y (1 − α) (15)
holds, then A1 > 0.
To ensure (c-3) is satisﬁed, we make the following parametric assumptions.
Assumption 2 (1 − α)(1− θy) − αθo − αλ
1
σ (1 − δo + δy)+λ
1
σδy > 0
Assumption 3 (1 − δo)(1− θy) >θ oδy
It is easily veriﬁed that Assumptions 2-3 are necessary for ct >θ t and xt >δ t to hold.
As before, we can, mutatis mutandis, construct a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation (using
(9)) in γt that links the growth rate at date t with that at date t+1. The deﬁnitions of mo-
mentary equilibrium, momentary bequest equilibrium, and dynamically-valid equilibrium
sequence, provided in the previous section, apply here as well.
17With the knowledge of the equilibrium allocations in hand, we now proceed to charac-
terize the time path of the growth rate. To presage, for a range of the altruism factor, λ,
one can construct dynamically-valid equilibrium sequences in which the bequest motive is
operative at every date — here Ricardian equivalence holds. For λ outside of this range,
momentary equilibria characterized by the non-negativity constraint on bequests binding
occasionally become possible. In this case, any equilibrium with bequests must display
intergenerational diﬀerences in bequest-giving behavior along both intensive and extensive
margins.
4.2 Dynamic linkages
We now investigate dynamic conﬁgurations represented by (9). To foreshadow, we will ﬁnd
that equilibria and dynamics are crucially connected to the size of λ, speciﬁcally whether
λ T (γce/z)
σ.
A No-Bequest Equilibrium. We start by investigating momentary equilibria assum-
ing the non-negativity constraint on bequests binds at each date. Here, the growth rate is
forever below the threshold rate, γt ≤ γce for t ≥ 1. Each generation receives no inheri-
tance, nor pass a bequest along, i.e., bt =0∀t ≥ 1. This corresponds to the conﬁguration
studied in Barnett and Bhattacharya (2008). The intragenerational optimality linkage in













≡ (1 − δo)αA − δy (1 − α)A + δyγt+1, (16)
and
g(γt) ≡ (1 − θy)(1− α)A − αAθo − (1 − θy)γt. (17)
18The presence of the rejuvenile externality (δy > 0) is critical here. In its absence, f is inde-
pendent of γ, and no dynamics in γ is possible; the only equilibrium that obtains is one in






More generally, when δy > 0,w eh a v e




where A2 ≡ z/δy > 0. Eq. (18) describes all momentary equilibria with zero bequests.
Using (18), it is easy to check that over this region,
∂γt+1




> 0 holds; also,
there exists a γmin such that lim
γt→γmin
γt+1 = γce. Since
∂γt+1
∂γt < 0, this implies the law of




γt+1 = A1 + A2
g (γce)
γce
≷ γce if λ ≷ (γce/z)
σ .
This, together with the fact that the law of motion is strictly decreasing, implies γt ≤ γce
for t ≥ 1 cannot hold if λ>(γce/z)
σ. In short, when λ>(γce/z)
σ , there are no valid
no-bequest equilibria in this SW quadrant of Figure 1.





γt+1 <γ ce holds. This, along with lim
γt→γmin
γt+1 = γce and
∂γt+1
∂γt < 0 implies (18) is as depicted in the SW quadrant in Figure 2 below. The existence














> −1 ⇔ Aδy (1 − α) − Aα(1 − δo) >z(1 − θy).
A Bequest Equilibrium. We turn next to the study of momentary bequest equilibria
by assuming the non-negativity constraint on bequests does not bind at any date. Here,
13This is the same condition as Assumption 3 in Barnett and Bhattacharya (2008). In this case, two
(but no higher period) cycles are possible in a neighborhood of the steady state γ
∗
rej. To reiterate, these
are cycles in the growth rate; along such cycles, the level of bequests will always be zero.
20γt >γ ce at each date so that Generation t receives a inheritance and passes a bequest



















, ∀γt+1 >γ ce
and








is deﬁned for γce ≤ γt <A .For future reference, note that (19) may be compactly written
as

















Clearly, γt+1 is an increasing and strictly concave function of γt.It is easy to check that
(21) admits two steady states, γA = A and γB = zλ1/σ, where Assumption 1 ensures that
γA >γ B. For reasons discussed earlier, the steady state, γA, is economically infeasible.









implying that γB is locally unstable. Similarly, γA is veriﬁed to be locally stable.
Finally, the location of γB relative to the cut-oﬀ, γce, remains to be checked. If
zλ1/σ >γ ce ⇔ λ>(γce/z)
σ holds (see Figure 1), then γB is to the right of the cut-
oﬀ,w h e r e a si fλ<(γce/z)
σ ,γ B is located to the left of the cut-oﬀ;i nt h i sc a s e ,t h e r ei sn o
21valid steady state (see Figure 2). These results are summarized in Proposition 2 below.
Figure 2: Dynamics of the growth rate when λ<(γce/z)
σ
Proposition 2 a) Suppose λ<(γce/z)
σ holds. Then, there exist sequences of momentary
bequest equilibria converging to γA, but γA itself not a momentary equilibrium, and hence,
these sequences themselves are not valid equilibrium paths.
b) Suppose λ>(γce/z)
σ holds. Then, there exists an unique equilibrium in which bequests
are granted at each date, and γt = zλ
1
σ for t ≥ 1. This equilibrium, the steady state γB, is
locally unstable.
A few remarks about Proposition 2, the analog of Proposition 1, are in order. First, if
λ>(γce/z)
σ holds, there exists an equilibrium in which the bequest motive is operative
at every date. This is depicted in the NE quadrant of Figure 1. By implication, this is an
equilibrium in which Ricardian equivalence holds. Second, this equilibrium is stationary,
22with γt = γB = zλ
1
σ. Third, it is unique; there is a unique γ1,n a m e l y ,γ1 = zλ
1
σ,t h a t
places the economy at this equilibrium. Finally, it deserves mention here that the growth
rate at this equilibrium is exactly the same as in the benchmark model. Of course, this does
not imply that equilibrium allocations, x, c,a n db, are the same across the two models.
When λ<(γce/z)
σ holds, γB (i.e., zλ
1
σ) is to the left of the cut-oﬀ; hence, the require-
ment that γt >γ ce holds at each date is violated at γB. The only steady-state of (21) is γA,
which, as noted, is an attracting but not economically-valid equilibrium point. Also note
that the bequest motive is operative at each and every date along the trajectory depicted in
the NE quadrant of Figure 2. The last two statements taken together imply the following.
No equilibrium sequence of growth rates can forever travel along the trajectory shown in
the NE quadrant of Figure 2; at some date, it has to leave this quadrant, and when it
does, the bequest motive will cease to operative. As a result, Ricardian equivalance will
not hold. Note that this is in sharp contrast to what transpires in the benchmark model
where either bequests are left and received by each and every generation or they are not
for any generation.
Before closing this section, we ask, is it possible that the bequest motive is non-operative
in the benchmark model but is operative in the model with consumption externalities? In
other words, can Ricardian equivalence fail to obtain in the benchmark economy and yet
hold in the corresponding model with consumption externalities?
Proposition 3 The bequest motive is operative in the model with consumption externali-





14An example of a parameter set that satisﬁes all previous parametric assumptions as well as (22) is:
λ =0 .49,A=1 .87,β=0 .74,α=0 .28,θ y =0 .44,θ o =0 .71,δ y =0 .08,δ o =0 .81, and σ =1 .74.










23Under the condition listed in Proposition 3 (or under other equivalent parametric con-
ditions), the presence of consumption externalities may have the potential to “jump start”
bequest-giving, with concomitant implications for Ricardian equivalence.
4.3 Deviant intergenerational linkages
In addition to describing the equilibrium growth paths for economies where the non-
negativity constraint on bequests either binds or does not bind at each date, eqs. (18)
and 20) also describe the relationship between consumption allocations between any two
consecutive dates assuming the current generation chooses the same course of action — as
it applies to bequests — as their parents. However, a priori there is no reason to believe
that an economy cannot support alternative equilibrium paths, ones where any one partic-
ular generation does not leave a bequest even though their predecessors did, nor do their
progeny feel they must follow in the same footsteps (bequest-wise) as their parents. These,
as mentioned in Section 1, we refer to as deviant generations; their actions depart from
those of their parents.
In addition to (18) and (20), the following can be used to describe the relation between
the growth rates of any two consecutive dates. We characterize these based on whether or
not a bequest is received and given.
No Inheritance Received, Bequest Given. If γt ≤ γce and γt+1 >γ ce, Generation
t will leave a bequest to Generation t+1even though Generation t−1 leaves no bequests
for t. Trivially, no steady state can exist in this quadrant since γt ≤ γce and γt+1 >γ ce

















must hold. From here, (22) follows. Parametric conditions, equivalent to (22), are also easy to formulate.
24It is possible to rewrite this in a form analogous to (18) and (20)




Eq.(23) describes all momentary equilibria of this type. Over this region,
∂γt+1








γt+1 = B1 + B2
g(γce)
γce
<γ ce if λ>(γce/z)
σ .
This, together with the fact that the law of motion is strictly increasing, implies γt ≤ γce
and γt+1 >γ ce cannot hold; hence, there are no valid equilibria in the NW quadrant of
Figure 1 if λ>(γce/z)
σ.
When λ<(γce/z)






implying that as we move from quadrant SW to quadrant NW, the law of motion is con-
tinuous. Similarly, since h(γce)=0 , the law of motion is continuous between quadrants
NE and NW, but it is not diﬀerentiable at γce, the separation between the quadrants.
Of course, there can be no dynamically-valid equilibrium sequence with two consequen-
tially dates spent in this quadrant because if γt ≤ γce, no inheritance is received at date t
and yet since γt+1 >γ ce, Generation t+1leaves a bequest (which means Generation t+2
receives an inheritance, which does not happen in quadrant NW).
Inheritance Received, No Bequest Given. If γt >γ ce and γt+1 ≤ γce,t h ec u r r e n t
growth rate is above the threshold rate γce needed to generate a bequest given to Generation
t from Generation t − 1, though Generation t leaves no bequests. This corresponds to the








25As before, this may be reformulated as










> 0 over this interval. Eq.(24) describes all momentary equilibria
of this type. First, consider the setting in which λ>(γce/z)
σ . It is immediately obvious
that, in this case, (24) cannot represent an equilibrium sequence. After all, in the SE
quadrant of Figure 1, bequests are received but not left, which implies the next point in
the sequence has to involve either quadrants NW or SW, both of which are empty of valid
equilibrium points.
When λ<(γce/z)
σ , the law of motion in (24), as depicted in Figure 2, is continuous






∂γt < 0, this implies γt+1 >A 1 ∀t. As in the NW quadrant, for reasons analogous
to those outlined above, there is no valid dynamically-valid equilibrium sequence with two
consecutive dates in this quadrant. In this sense, the ‘law of motion’ in the NE and SW
quadrants is nothing more a loci of momentary equilibrium points.
5 Bequest dynamics and growth cycles
Our results thus far indicate that when λ>(γce/z)
σ , there is a unique equilibrium (see Fig-
ure 1), one in which bequests are left and received each period. Here, Ricardian equivalence
obtains. However, when λ<(γce/z)
σ , there is no dynamically-valid equilibrium sequence
in which bequests are left every period. The non-negativity constraint on bequests binds
at some dates, and Ricardian equivalence fails. Interestingly though, a dynamically-valid
sequence of momentary equilibria that supports bequest-giving, at least some of the time,
may exist.
26One example of a dynamically-valid sequence of momentary equilibria, in which the
non-negativity constraint on bequests binds occasionally, involves two branches of the law
of motion (9)-(10) depicted in quadrants NW and SE of Figure 3. In such an example, the
current generation would leave a bequest but their children wouldn’t, but their children
would, and so on — a simple example of generational bequest 2-cycles. These bequest cycles
are a consequence of 2-cycles in the growth rate.16
Figure 3: A 3-period limit cycle in the growth rate when λ<(γce/z)
σ .
An alternative cyclical path is illustrated in Figure 3. In this conﬁguration, the time
path for the equilibrium growth rate forever travels from γa to γb to γc and back to
γa. This constitutes a three-period limit cycle successively involving quadrant NW (no
inheritance received but bequest left), quadrant NE (inheritance received and bequest
16Similar, higher-order cycles (such as, a 4-period cycle) may also emerge between these two quadrants.
27left) and quadrant SE (inheritance received but no bequest left) onto quadrant NW (no
inheritance received but bequest left). In common parlance, Generation t is a generous,
deviant generation (it received no inheritance but left a bequest), followed by Generation
t +1(a generation that acts in a manner consistent with their parent’s actions), with
Generation t +2the deviant, stingy one (it received inheritances but left no bequests),
followed by a new generous Generation t +3 , and so forth.17
Formally, the 3-period limit cycle in the growth rate depicted in Figure 3, is summarized
by a triplet of growth rates, γa, γb, γc that satisﬁes the intratemporal optimality linkages
given by
¡Λ
A (1 − δo + δy) − δy
¢
(A − γb)γa
(1 − θy)(1− α)A − αAθo − (1 − θy)γa
= z, (25)
¡Λ
A (1 − δo + δy) − δy
¢
(A − γc)γb ¡






¢ = z, (26)
and
((1 − δo)αA − δy (1 − α)A + δyγa)γc ¡






¢ = z. (27)
Under parametric conditions, there exists a triplet (γa,γb,γc), the simultaneous solution
to (25)-(27).18 An example of such a cycle is given below. 19
17A tv a r i o u sp o i n t se a r l i e r ,w eh a v en o t e dt h ei m p o r t a n c eo fa s s u m i n gδy > 0 — the presence of rejuvenile
behavior. For if δy =0w a st r u e ,t h el a wo fm o t i o nw o u l dh a v en oc o n t i n u o u ss e g m e n t si nq u a d r a n t sS W
and SE and hence cycles, such as the one illustrated in Figure 3, that rely on “bouncing oﬀ”m o m e n t a r y
equilibrium points in quadrants SW and SE would be impossible.
18These individual segments of momentary equilibria (depicted in the four quadrants of Figure 3) are
reminiscent of the notion of “Euler equation branching” in Stockman, 2010. Stockman notes that in his
study, “each branch alone will not imply interesting dynamics”, but switching between branches allows
for more intricate dynamics, and even, chaos. In our case, some branches cannot support dynamics on
their own, but with the help of other branches, one can generate interesting dynamics, as in Figure 3.
And although we do not pursue this link of inquiry, we conjecture that our system can support sunspot
equilibria.
19The law of motion across all four quadrants is continuous everywhere; as noted earlier, though, it is
28Example 1 Let α =1 /3,β=1 ,σ=2 /3,A=1 .75,θ y =1 /3,θ o =1 /3,δ y =2 /3,
δo =1 /2, and λ =0 .2. The unique steady-state growth rate is 0.78209 and the critical
growth rate for bequests γce =0.86303. A dynamically-valid equilibrium sequence,
that is a limit cycle of periodicity three, is summarized by the triplet (γa,γb,γc)=
(0.72924,1.15993,1.72973), the simultaneous solution to (25)-(27).















































Figure 4: T h e3 - c y c l ei nE x a m p l e1
In both the benchmark model and the model with intergenerational consumption ex-
ternalities, it is the older generation’s expectation of the future growth rate that is critical
not diﬀerentiable at several points. If a one-dimensional map (such as ours) is continuous and admits a
three-period cycle, then by the Li-Yorke theorem (see Azariadis, 1993) existence of topological chaos is
assured. By the Sarkovski theorem, cycles of all orders are possible. We do not pursue this line of inquiry
here.
29in determining whether or not they leave a bequest. The future growth rate contains sum-
mary information on the relative amounts of resources committed by the young generation
to current consumption and saving, which ultimately determines the marginal beneﬁtt o
the old of leaving a bequest. A high level of saving (higher growth rate) means a lower
level of consumption for the child and a greater marginal beneﬁto ft h eb e q u e s tg i f t ;o n
the other hand, a low level of savings (higher current consumption for the child) means the
gift has a smaller marginal impact on the child’s utility when young.
One can, loosely speaking, interpret the future growth rate as an indicator of the child’s
commitment to pass on resources to the future. After all, in this Ak framework with a
ﬁxed return to capital, the amount of resources a child has available to leave bequests to
the future will depend directly on the amount of saving she commits to when young.
However, unlike in the benchmark model, in the economy with intertemporal consump-
tion externalities, the child’s decision to save more or less aﬀects more than simply the
marginal beneﬁto fab e q u e s t ,λu0 (ct+1;θt). Consider, for an example, the case in which
the child has high saving. Here, the concomitant low consumption ct+1 reduces the con-
sumption ﬂoor δt of the child’s parent, thereby reducing the marginal cost of the gift. This
may enable the parent to leave bequest even in the absence of receiving an inheritance
herself — or equivalently — having saved enough to raise the growth rate γt to a level high
enough to trigger a bequest from her own parent (the grandparent of the child). Similarly,
low saving by the child is consistent with a parent acting selﬁshly (not leaving a bequest
despite receiving an inheritance). Low saving (higher consumption by child) imposes a
higher consumption ﬂoor on the parent, making it more diﬃcult to pass along a gift.
Of course, as we have modeled it, these consumption externalities work both ways. In
the case described immediately above, for example, the higher levels of consumption of
as e l ﬁsh parent imposes a higher consumption ﬂoor θt on the child, forcing the child to
consume more now — save less — rendering the growth rate below the threshold γce.
We close with a discussion on indeterminacy. From Figure 1, it is apparent that when
30λ>(γce/z)
σ , there is no indeterminacy. But when λ<(γce/z)
σ, a scope for indeterminacy
arises. As depicted in Figure 3, the relationship between γt+1 and γt is a correspondence in
the forward dynamics. This means given the current growth rate, perfect-foresight agents
may choose high or low next-period growth rates. Hence, along two equilibrium sequences
that may emanate from the same initial condition, the time series of growth rates can
look very diﬀerent. This sort of indeterminacy is not possible in the benchmark model.
Consequently, the model predicts there can be non-convergence in growth rates across
countries in the sense that countries that ‘look similar’ at some point in time may end up
looking very diﬀerent in the future.
Figure 3 also contains useful information about potential non-convergence in bequest-
giving behavior across countries. For instance, consider two otherwise-identical countries
I and II, that diﬀer only in their initial growth rate; I, for example, starts oﬀ in the NE
quadrant and II in quadrant SW. In this case, while multiple generations in I may leave
and receive bequests (as suggested by the 3 period cycle in Figure 3), those in II may
forever leave nothing.
6 Minimum consumption requirements
Finally, we turn to the issue of whether consumption externalities are really essential to
our story. At ﬁrst blush, it may appear that consumption externalities add a fair bit
of complexity and yet, possibly do little more than install consumption ﬂoors, θ and δ,
for various generations. It may seem that replacing all such externalities by a simple
generational minimum consumption requirement would be suﬃcient to generate all the
above results, including the possibility of deviant generations. Below, we argue this is not
the case.
To that end, we deﬁne minimum consumption requirements (henceforth “MCR”) in the
following manner: θt ≡ θyt and δt ≡ δyt+1. Notice, for these requirements to be meaningful,
they must track the growing economy; otherwise, constant MCR become insigniﬁcant (and
31hence, non binding) in a growing economy. The problem of a young agent is the same as
that in Section 2: maximizing (3) subject to c1-c4. Using (9)-(10), the budget constraint
c-2, xt + bt = αAkt+1, the optimal consumption and bequest choices (setting aside for the





















































Installing the ﬂoors θt = θAkt and δt = δAkt+1, it is straightforward to show that




((1 − α − θ)A − γt)kt if γt ≤ e γ∗
mcr µ






















γtkt if γt+1 > e γ∗
mcr
.
From these, we gather restrictions needed for the growth rates to be economically valid:
α ≥ δ and (1 − θ − δ)A ≥ γt. Using the above expressions and conditions, we are able to
prove the following:
Proposition 4 Either the parameter restriction zλ
1
σ > e γ∗
mcr holds, in which case bequests
are given and received in every period, or zλ
1
σ < e γ∗
mcr holds, and no bequests are given or
received in any period.
32A proof is provided in the appendix. As Proposition 4 indicates, the parameter restric-
tions zλ
1
σ > e γ∗
mcr and zλ
1
σ < e γ∗
mcr are mutually exclusive and preclude the coexistence
of equilibria with positive bequests alongside those with zero bequests. Such an econ-
omy “qualitatively” behaves in an almost-identical manner to the benchmark economy of
Section 3, one without any consumption externalities.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper extends the existing literature on the operativeness of the bequest motive
to models incorporating intergenerational consumption spillovers. These externalities are
introduced into a standard Ak growth model populated by overlapping generations of
agents with dynastic preferences. In our setup, an agent faces a consumption ﬂoor set
by every other agent alive at that point of her life-cycle. In the benchmark economy,
one without any consumption externalities, either the bequest motive is operative for all
generations (in which case, Ricardian equivalence holds) or it is never operative. The
possibility, that some generation may receive an inheritance but not leave a bequest, and
vice versa, does not arise.
In the economy with the aforementioned consumption externalities, somewhat sur-
prisingly, there exists a steady-state equilibrium in which inheritances are received and
bequests left at each date; consequently, Ricardian equivalence holds. However, there also
exists equilibria in which the bequest motive is occasionally operative. We prove the ex-
istence of “deviant” bequest-giving behavior — that is, where a generation does not follow
the same sort of bequest behavior as their predecessors did. Such intergenerational varia-
tions in the generosity of bequest-giving roughly conform to popular notions of generous
and stingy generations.20 They also hasten the failure of Ricardian equivalence in a man-
20There is some casual evidence suggesting a shift in parental gift-giving is currently underway. In the
U.K, for example, Cowie (2005) notes “two in three adults with the means to make a bequest say they
plan to enjoy life and not worry too much about leaving a legacy. This social trend has already spawned
an approximate acronym — ‘skiing’ or Spending the Kids’ Inheritance.” Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ (2000) study
33ner conjectured by Abel (1987). The economy with consumption externalities also admits
indeterminacies that were absent in the benchmark economy. These externalities also pro-
duces a large variety of endogenous growth cycles that were not possible in the benchmark
economy. Finally, an otherwise-identical model, one in which consumption externalities are
replaced by (growing) minimum consumption requirements, cannot produce any of these
results.
The analysis in the current paper does not dwell much on the interaction between the
production externalities coming from the technology side and the consumption externali-
ties entering from the preference side — the subject matter of Liu and Turnovsky (2005),
although not in the context of bequest giving. Similarly, we are silent on the issue of
eﬃciency of the bequest equilibria, something that Alonso-Carrera et. al. (2008) have
investigated. If some heterogeneity is allowed — some in a generation allow their children
to inﬂuence their consumption but not others — then the occasionally-binding constraints
on bequests would also have important implications for wealth distributions across gener-
ations. Investigation of these important topics within the context of our preferences and
technology speciﬁcations is left to future research.
survey-based evidence from the U.S. and ﬁnd that “among all households, the percentage of those who
believe it is important to leave an estate for one’s heirs has declined from 52.5 percent to 48.4 percent
during the 1990s alone.... According to the latest data, only 27 percent of all households and only 22
percent of households headed by someone over 65 expect to leave a sizable bequest.”
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A Proof of Proposition 1












z+Aα if γt,γt+1 ≤ γbm no no






γt if γt ≤ γbm ≤ γt+1 no yes












if γt+1 ≤ γbm ≤ γt yes no





γt if γbm ≤ γt,γt+1 yes yes
Some work is required to verify that the above intertemporal conditions satisfy the
conditions on growth rates stated in the third column of Table A1. Note that in cases A
and C we have a simple condition on γt, while cases B and D are slightly more complicated.
For case A, noting that γt is trivially positive, we need
γt =
Az (1 − α)
z + Aα
≤ γbm
which with straightforward algebra can be written as
λ1/σz ≤ γbm. (28)














≥ γbm ⇔ γbm ≤ λ
1
σz. (29)
Note that these two conditions exactly contradict each other. This implies that equilibria
paths can never display both cases A and C.
Now consider case B. Here the constraint we must verify is γt ≤ γbm ≤ γt+1. First
check
γbm ≤ γt+1 ⇔ γt ≥
(1 − α)zA
z + αA
37Thus, for the entire constraint to be satisﬁed, we must have
(1 − α)zA
z + αA
≤ γt ≤ γbm.
It is easy to verify that
(1−α)zA




Comparing this expression with (28) and (29) we see that equilibrium paths can possibly
display both cases A and B, but never B and C. That is, cases A and B are inconsistent
with C. Note however, that case C — where the old leave no bequest — must be followed
by a case where the young receive no bequest and A and B are the only cases where the
young receive no bequest. Since cases A and B are inconsistent with case C, this implies
that case C is inconsistent with any equilibrium path. This has the further implication
that once an economy ﬁnds itself in case D with bequest both received and given, it must
stay there forever, since there are no valid equilibrium points where bequest are received
but not given (case C).
Finally we turn out attention to case D. First note that

















Now consider the intertemporal condition. This has two ﬁxed points. One at zλ
1
σ and
another, economically invalid one at A.21 To establish which points may be part of a valid
equilibrium path we need to analyze the dynamic properties of the intertemporal condition.




















such that the intertemporal condition is increasing in γt and concave to the origin. Fur-
thermore the slope at zλ
1




















21At this steady state, x = c =0and these points have inﬁnite marginal utility, and hence would never
be valid.
38This leaves two possibilities: Either zλ
1
σ >A ,in which case zλ
1
σ is economically invalid, or
zλ
1





σ > 1 such that zλ
1
σ is an unstable ﬁxed point and A
is stable. Since we demonstrated above that once in case D we must stay in case D, we can
rule out all growth rates higher than zλ
1
σ, as these economies would eventually converge
to the (invalid) ﬁxed point A. This implies that for D to contain any points that could be
part of an equilibrium path, we need γbm <z λ
1
σ. This in turn is inconsistent with cases A
and B, so we have either Aa n dBor D. Now focus on case D with growth rates greater
than γbm but less than zλ
1











we have γt+1 = γbm. Thus, our intertemporal condition starts out below the 45-degree
line and crosses it once at the unstable SS zλ
1
σ. If γt <z λ
1
σ, because the ﬁxed point is
unstable, we will eventually enter the range where bequest are received but not given (Case
C)). Since there are no valid points in this range, this rules out Case D with γt <z λ
1
σ and
the only valid point is the steady state zλ
1
σ.
Finally note that since cases B and D are incompatible, this renders case B invalid,
since in case B a bequest is given, the next period must involve receipt of a bequest. This
only happens in cases C and D, which are incompatible with case B. Thus, we are left with
either case A or case D. This leaves us with two possibilities:
zλ
1
σ <γ bm and γ =
Az (1 − α)
z + Aα




σ >γ bm and γ = zλ
1
σ (bequests given and received).
B Proof of Proposition 4
In the case where no bequests are left at each date, it is easy to check that γt =
z(1−α−θ)A
(α−δ)A+z




mcr. In the case where bequests are left each date, we
have
µ

























σ +( 1− θ − δ)A. (30)
39There are two steady state solutions to (30), the infeasible (1 − θ − δ)A and zλ
1
σ. This
implies, that either there exists a valid steady state in which bequests are left or one in
which they are never left, and conditions for the existence of one or the other are mutually
exclusive.
What about other intertemporal linkages? Consider the case where no bequest is re-
ceived but bequest is left. This happens when γt ≤ e γ∗









γtkt = z ((1 − α − θ)A − γt)kt,
which simpliﬁes to
γt+1 = −














+( 1− θ − δ)A. (31)
It remains to verify that indeed γt ≤ e γ∗
mcr ≤ γt+1 holds. Note from (31) that
∂γt+1
∂γt > 0
holds; so at γt = e γ∗
mcr,γ t+1 ≥ e γ∗
mcr must hold, otherwise γt ≤ e γ∗
mcr ≤ γt+1 can never hold.
Simple algebra reveals that γt+1 ≥ e γ∗
mcr ⇔ zλ
1
σ ≤ e γ∗
mcr.
Finally, focus attention on the case where a bequest is received but not given. This
happens when γt > e γ∗
mcr and γt+1 ≤ e γ∗
mcr. In this case, it is easy to check that
γt =
(1 − δ − θ)A
zλ
1








and that γt > e γ∗
mcr holds when zλ
1
σ > e γ∗
mcr.
The upshot is the following. If zλ
1
σ > e γ∗
mcr,w eh a v et w op o s s i b l yv a l i dc a s e s . O n e
is the case where bequests are given and received each period; the other is a case where
bequests are received but never given. If zλ
1
σ < e γ∗
mcr, we again have two possibly valid
cases. One is the case with no bequests given or received ever; the other is the case where
no bequests are received, but bequests are left.
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